Introduction
Violent extremism affects the well-being, dignity and security of individuals and communities, and it also poses grave challenges to the protection and enjoyment of human rights. Globally, the occurrence of attacks from violent extremists is increasing and violent extremism has taken the lives of many innocent people of different nationalities, races, gender, age and creed.

Violent extremism is a diverse phenomenon, without clear definition. It is neither new nor exclusive to any region, nationality or belief. While extremists’ violent attacks can never be justified, we must also acknowledge that the ideology fueling their actions does not arise in a vacuum, as the UN Secretary-General’s Plan of Action states: “Narratives of grievance, actual or perceived injustice, promised empowerment and sweeping change become attractive where human rights are being violated, good governance is being ignored and aspirations are being crushed”.

The root causes of violent extremism are complex, multifaceted and often intertwined. Thus, there is a need to for a comprehensive, multi-stakeholder approach which encompasses not only security-based counter-terrorism measures, but also preventive measures which directly address the drivers of the phenomenon. Any measure to prevent violent extremism will need to be anchored in a human rights approach and will need to be carried out in such a manner that specific groups are not targeted, and the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms are not violated.

The Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) is an intergovernmental forum for dialogue and cooperation established in 1996 to deepen relations between Asia and Europe. The organisation addresses political, economic and socio-cultural issues of common concern. The 18th Informal ASEM Seminar on Human Rights aims to contribute toward a better mutual understanding of violent extremism and its underlying causes, to discuss the human rights impact of measures adopted to prevent violent extremism, as well as to identify good preventive initiatives that are aligned with human rights standards.

Background
Having an internationally recognised definition of violent extremism is crucial for the development of policies and programs concerned with its prevention. However, despite the numerous prevention of violent extremism initiatives and policy measures addressing violent extremism, a generally agreed-upon understanding of the characteristics specific to violent extremism is yet to emerge and thus, the phenomenon remains an ‘elusive concept’. 
Furthermore, the terms violent extremism, radicalisation, and terrorism are frequently used interchangeably. While they are closely connected concepts, they should not be understood as simple linear processes. While radicalism, connected to radicalisation, has been said to seek making changes to the existing political and social structure, it does not necessarily lead to violence. Radicalisation has also been described as a context-bound phenomenon with several common ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors but no single determining feature.

‘Extremism’, on the other hand, has been referred to as the adoption of a particular ideology with the intention to use violence to remove the state or ruling structure and its elites. It may also refer to a belief in or support for ideas that are diametrically opposed to a society’s core values and a willingness to further them through violent means. The terminology of violent extremism has been used to construe a broader and more expansive concept than terrorism, because it accommodates any kind of violence (even non-violent acts) so long as its motivation is deemed extremist.

The elasticity of the term violent extremism and the lack of clarity on what leads individuals to embrace violent extremism, however, means that the concept can easily be misused, exploited or manipulated. In the absence of a clear definition, the term is likely to be utilised to restrict a wide range of lawful activities and expression. Another risk of a poorly defined concept which alludes to a political and social threat is that some governments may apply it as a tool to suppress political opposition or ideological dissent. As noted by the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism, legislation relating to extremism has been used against the activities of non-violent groups, religious texts of non-violent groups, and against journalists and political activists critical of state policy. Furthermore, measures are used increasingly to justify profiling, surveillance and other activities that treat certain communities as de facto suspects, promoting a climate of intolerance and alienating members of these communities.

While the preventing of violent extremism is often presented as a softer approach to countering terrorism and packaged as positive measures, many initiatives have a significant potential to threaten the human rights of equality and freedom from discrimination, the freedoms of expression, association, and religion or belief and the right to privacy. As such, preventive measures may run the risk of being counterproductive and isolating the very communities whose cooperation is most needed to fight violent extremism.

### Relevant Human Rights Standards

Preventing violent extremism is a commitment and obligation under the principles and values enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration, and other international human rights instruments.

Human rights are also placed as a red thread throughout the UN Secretary-General’s Plan of Action on Preventing Violent Extremism, in which the following links between human rights and violent extremism are made:

I. Violent extremism poses a direct threat to the enjoyment of human rights;
II. Grievances at the community level may contribute to the rise of violent extremism, and for example, repressive policies and practices that violate fundamental rights and the rule of law can heighten the lure of violent extremism;
III. Individual experiences of human rights violations, such as torture or violations of due process, can play a role in an individual’s path to radicalisation;
IV. States that embrace international human rights norms and standards, and uphold the rule of law, create an enabling environment for civil society and reduce the appeal to violent extremism.

The Secretary-General’s Plan of Action contains more than 70 comprehensive recommendations for national, regional and international action. Furthermore, the document calls for countries to focus on the “underlying conditions that provide violent extremist groups the opportunity to take root” by providing opportunities for education, employment and inclusion. It also stresses that “over the longer-term, the biggest threat to terrorists is not the power of missiles – it is the politics of inclusion”.

Asia
Due to socio-economic, political, and cultural differences between countries in Asia, there is no regionally coordinated strategy to address violent extremism and countries have sought to deal with it through various approaches, or combinations thereof, ranging from military measures, socio-economic incentives, and educational policies; as well as the enactment and enforcement of laws related to counter terrorism / radicalisation and violent extremism. Furthermore, there is no Asia-wide human rights declaration (unlike in Europe, Africa and the Americas), but there is a sub-regional ASEAN Human Rights Declaration which was adopted by all the 10 member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 2012.

ASEAN has also adopted several documents in relation to the prevention of violent extremism and human rights, including the Manila Declaration to Counter the Rise of Radicalisation and Violent Extremism by the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime in September 2017, as well as the Joint Statement on Promoting Women, Peace and Security in ASEAN in November 2017. Although the instruments adopted by ASEAN are not legally binding and are largely characterised as “soft law”, they can influence, act as standard-setters, and provide a helpful framework through which the varied policies addressing prevention of violent extremism and human rights of the ASEAN can be coordinated.

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which was established in 2001 as a multilateral association to ensure security and maintain stability across the Eurasian region, also pays special attention to the fight against violent extremism, and in 2017 adopted the SCO Convention on Countering Extremism in this regard. Besides aiming at advancing security, increasing effective cooperation between authorities and improving the legal framework in this sphere, the Convention stresses the need to ensure that preventive efforts respect the rule of law, human rights and freedoms. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization has currently 8 members, including the following ASEM countries, China, India, Kazakstan, Pakistan and Russia.

Europe
“There is a compelling duty for states to protect the general interest of public security and the rule of law without jeopardizing the core of human rights, which are enshrined notably in the European Convention on Human Rights.” (Commissioner for Human Rights, Council of Europe)

Preventing violent extremism is a high-priority policy area for which the European Union (EU) has a range of external action tools at its disposal that connect the internal and external dimensions of EU policy in Europe. While violent extremism is primarily addressed within the context of security-based counter-terrorism measures, all EU interventions to prevent violent extremism are bound to adhere to a ‘do no harm and do maximum good’ principle, meaning that no intervention should cause human rights violations, exacerbate divisions between institutions and communities or worsen existing grievances. Furthermore, all preventive measures undertaken by member states of the EU must be in compliance with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, and respect the right to private life, the right to security, the right to data protection, the presumption of innocence, the right
to a fair trial and due process, freedom of expression and freedom of religion; while preserving the right to liberty and security of European citizens.\textsuperscript{30}

The EU has issued several policies and communications relating to violent extremism.\textsuperscript{31} In 2016, the European Commission issued a \textit{Communication on Supporting the Prevention of Radicalisation Leading to Violent Extremism} in which it calls for a comprehensive approach in “preventing radicalisation to violent extremism”. The document stresses that violent extremism is a complex phenomenon that calls for an in-depth knowledge and a multi-faceted response across several policy areas and various actors, including authorities and civil society at a local, regional and European level.\textsuperscript{32} The communication identifies 7 key areas related to the prevention of violent extremism, including the promotion of inclusive education and EU common values, and an open and resilient society, which reaches out to its younger generations.\textsuperscript{33}

\textbf{Push and Pull Factors}

The push and pull factors related to violent extremism are multiple and interrelated and vary significantly between different contexts, groups and individuals. According to Muhsin Hassan (2012), push factors are \textit{“the negative social, cultural, and political features of one’s societal environment that aid in ‘pushing’ vulnerable individuals onto the path of violent extremism”}.\textsuperscript{34} These variables are also commonly known as “underlying/root causes” and spring from dissatisfaction relating to personal or political circumstances.\textsuperscript{35} These can include perceptions of injustice and marginalization and other individual experiences of human rights violations.

Pull factors, in contrast, refer to the characteristics of an extremist group that are perceived as positive by new recruits and may persuade vulnerable individuals to become drawn in.\textsuperscript{36} For example, a violent extremist group may be a source of services and employment for some of its recruits. Simultaneously, vulnerable young persons may view the very same organisation as a promised sense of belonging, acceptance and a pathway to establishing identity. Other individuals may be pulled towards extremist groups due to their ideology, or by social ties, recruitment narratives and media.

Although experts have identified some common “push” and “pull” factors that help explain why some individuals become involved in violent extremism, it must be kept in mind that there is no single cause or pathway into violent extremism and no archetype of a of violent extremist.\textsuperscript{37} Also, while there is research available on the social, psychological, and contextual factors that may render some individuals susceptible to religious-based extremism,\textsuperscript{38} there remains very little evidence of what drives other forms of violent extremism, such as ethno-nationalist extremist violence, despite the increase in its occurrence.\textsuperscript{39} Although violent extremist groups have been found to use the internet and social media to their advance, it is unclear whether this kind of internet usage, or the resulting exposure of extremist narratives to the public, stands in direct correlation to an increase of extremist attacks or the attempted recruitment through extremist organisations.\textsuperscript{40}

\textbf{Impact on Human Rights of Measures to Prevent Violent Extremism}

Measures taken by governments to prevent violent extremism are diverse and include a wide array of initiatives, which are intended to target different groups of individuals or local communities and involve diverse series of activities. Some measures target ‘extremist’ speech and restrict free expression, while some focus on building community resilience or addressing the underlying conditions that may drive individuals to join violent extremist groups.\textsuperscript{41} Some countries also provide programs involving individual interventions, such as counselling or mentoring.\textsuperscript{42}

However, some of the measures have the potential to violate specific fundamental human rights and freedoms. From a human rights perspective, measures that target individuals or groups based on misconceptions about their susceptibility to violent extremism are particularly concerning as such an approach can be discriminatory and stigmatise various groups and communities.
This approach is also in conflict with Article 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) which guarantees equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground, as well as equality before the law and equal protection of the law. Furthermore, initiatives to prevent violent extremism also carry some risk of negatively affecting the right to privacy, as well as the freedoms of expression, association, and religion or belief, which are also guaranteed by the ICCPR.

Measures taken on the basis of suspicion may violate fair trial guarantees or other human rights standards such as the presumption of innocence or due process, while measures that involve educational institutions can have a potential to infringe on the right to education. Some countries have also considered amending aspects of their national legislation to prevent the internal movement or entry of individuals considered to be “extremist”, which can have a serious impact on the freedom of movement of the individual and on the right of refugees from protection under the 1951 Convention.

Community-driven Initiatives

As the drivers of violent extremism vary within as well as between countries, it is the local communities that are arguably the most conveniently placed to understand what these drivers are, why they change, and how best to address them. Also, community-led initiatives are considered to be more effective than national or regional approaches due to their flexibility in preventing violent extremism on a case-by-case level.

Community actors have an important role to play in education, advocacy, oversight, as service providers, and they can also help to align prevention of violent extremism measures with respect for human rights and the rule of law. Furthermore, community-based approaches can be effective in building resilience against violent extremism and promoting social cohesion and tolerance.

According to a global survey by Center for Strategic and International Studies on Global Perceptions of Violent Extremism, a significant majority of the respondents supported community-led efforts and targeted, prolonged information campaigns to undermine extremists’ narratives and ideologies, while half of the respondents indicated that that their governments’ response to containing and preventing violent extremism was inadequate and that that military efforts to date had not worked. Despite this, civil society actors remain an underutilised resource, and local communities often found themselves excluded from policy dialogue on the prevention of violent extremism. In contrast to the latter survey findings, the important role of civil society organisations and local communities in developing and implementing responses to violent extremism is increasingly recognised by national, regional, and multilateral actors, and a number of UN resolutions, statements and communications issued by the EU and ASEAN call for a comprehensive approach to prevention of violent extremism that engages civil society and communities.

The UN Secretary General’s Plan of Action on Preventing Violent Extremism stresses the need for member states to “develop joint and participatory strategies, including with civil society and local communities, to prevent the emergence of violent extremism”. The ASEAN Ministers have acknowledged “the role of civil society organisations, private sector and non-government organisations in collaboration with ASEAN Member States, preventing the process of radicalisation leading to violent extremism” and the need for development of an “integrated, evidence-based approach to addressing the threats of the rise of radicalisation and violent extremism by engaging communities and empowering women and youth.

Similarly, the EU has expanded its approach beyond “hard-power” initiatives and law enforcement interventions and has recognised the need for inclusion and participation of multiple civil society players. In the Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy, the EU agrees to “deepen dialogue with the UN, while building broad partnerships with states, regional organisations, etc.”
civil society and the private sector on issues such as countering violent extremism". The world’s largest security organisation, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) has similarly reinforced the importance of involving civil society in efforts to prevent violent extremism, and also highlighted the need to increase civil society organisations’ awareness about ways in which they can contribute to the prevention of violent extremism.

**Violent Extremism and Women**

The roles of women in relation to violent extremism have remained less explored by policy makers and practitioners, despite the participation of women in violent extremism and their critical roles in its prevention.

Women are often viewed as being highly influential in families, communities, and governments, and owing to this, they can play critical roles in detecting and preventing violent extremism. Since women are strategically positioned at the center of the family, it has been suggested, for example, that they can help build resilience within their communities starting from their own families and respond to children’s early signs of violent extremism. Critics have, however, observed that efforts to include women have tended to focus more on women’s engagement at the informal level (e.g. as mothers and wives) and less on women’s roles as policy shapers, activists and educators.

Besides their involvement in prevention, women are also active agents engaging in violent extremist movement, and it has been estimated that women account for approximately 20 to 30 percent of membership of terrorist groups. The number of women providing active support or encouragement for violent extremists in their own families and communities has increased substantially in recent years, while many are also joining the fight on the battlefield or playing an operational role in a terrorist attack. It is estimated that around 17 percent of all individuals travelling to the battlefields of Syria and Iraq are women.

Although the role of women as actors of violent extremism remains relatively unexplored, the research seems to suggest that women are driven to violent extremism by many of the same factors that motivate their male counterparts. Women’s motivations are said to include: adherence to a particular political ideology or religious belief; grievance and concern with injustice; a desire for revenge, redemption, or honour, an aspiration to spur societal change or a drive for power or adventure. Furthermore, women and girls often experience distinct ‘push’ factors that increase their vulnerability to recruitment as well as specific ‘pull’ factors that violent extremist organisations use to target and recruit females.

Besides women’s varied roles in aiding, abetting and preventing violent extremism, women and girls are often targeted by violent extremists for gender-based violence, including abductions, forced marriages, sexual violence, attacks on women human rights defenders and leaders, restitutions of girls' access to education and on their freedom of movement. Thus, prevention of these attacks, providing protection for women and girls who are most at risk, rejecting societal acceptance, prosecuting perpetrators, and providing assistance for female survivors are essential actions which should be undertaken as part of the efforts to prevent violent extremism.

The gender dimension of violent extremism has started to draw more interest in recent years, and the roles of women in addressing violence and extremism have been highlighted, for example, in a number of Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) meetings and workshops, where it has been noted that women are critical stakeholders and can actively help prevent violent extremism. The European Union has also started to recognise the relevance of including a gender perspective in all its efforts and now considers women as potential partners in its efforts in prevention of violent extremism. Additionally, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has made a number of commitments.
to address gender equality and the roles of women in conflict and violent extremism in its recently adopted Joint Statement on Promoting Women, Peace and Security in ASEAN.\textsuperscript{79}

The roles of women in peace and conflict resolution have been emphasised in several UN instruments, most notably in UN Security Council Resolution 1325 and subsequent resolutions on women, peace, and security. In his Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism (2015), the UN Secretary-General also places a significant emphasis on gender and noted in particular that 'societies for which gender indicators are higher are less vulnerable to violent extremism'. The Secretary-General further recommended that gender perspectives would be mainstreamed across all efforts to prevent violent extremism and that efforts to counter extremism must include efforts to empower women.\textsuperscript{80}

**Youth, Education & Prevention of Violent Extremism**

“Disarming the process of radicalization must begin with human rights and the rule of law, with dialogue across all boundary lines, by empowering all young women and men, and by starting as early as possible, on the benches of schools.” (UNESCO)\textsuperscript{81}

As youth are often marginalised from local and national development gains, they are particularly vulnerable to economic shocks, social instability, and conflicts.\textsuperscript{82} Furthermore, young people are frequently left behind despite widespread development in other age groups. They are also often left out of decision-making processes, which limits their potential to determine their own future.

Young people who feel disengaged and isolated by their community may, in turn, be more vulnerable to being influenced by ‘pull’ factors and therefore more susceptible to violent extremism. Besides being at higher risk drawn into violent extremism, young people are also likely targets of recruitment strategies of violent extremists.\textsuperscript{83} As the most active media consumers, young people are particularly vulnerable to extremist narratives which are propagated across various online platforms.\textsuperscript{84}

Education is one of the most important tools to reach young people and can be used to address some of the “push and pull factors” that may drive young people towards violent extremism. Education can act as a preventive measure by making young people more resilient citizens and by strengthening their emotional, intellectual and psychological development\textsuperscript{85}, but it can also play a role in promoting respect for diversity, inclusion and human rights. Furthermore, good education enables people to obtain jobs, qualify for higher income levels and generate productivity gains which fuel economic development.\textsuperscript{86} Education can also help youth to counter violent extremism narratives by helping them to become critical thinkers and equipping them with, for example, media and information literacy.

At the same time, however, education can be leveraged to radicalise young people\textsuperscript{87}, and used to exacerbate existing tensions and divisions, foster exclusion and inequality, and promote harmful ideologies and behavior.\textsuperscript{88} Thus, while it is important that education is inclusive, non-discriminatory and encouraging of participation and multiple viewpoints, education initiatives should also look beyond the classroom and into the broader mechanisms of governance and representation to address the root causes that underlie different forms of violence and violent extremism.\textsuperscript{89}

However, while the right to education has been recognised as a human right in various international conventions\textsuperscript{90} and as one of the key targets of the **Sustainable Development Goals** adopted by UN member countries in 2015, many children and youth face barriers in accessing and receiving quality education.\textsuperscript{91} Despite considerable gains in education enrollment in the past decade, only 63 per cent of youth accessed upper secondary school education in 2014, according to the *Progress towards the Sustainable Development Goals* Report by the UN Secretary-General. Additionally, in nearly eighty per cent of the countries included in the report, more than one in ten youths were neither in the educational system nor working. Youth were also almost three times as likely as adults to be unemployed.\textsuperscript{92}
The importance of addressing violent extremism in relation to its impact on youth and through education has recently gained global attention.\textsuperscript{93} The issue has been acknowledged, for example, through the passing of the UN Security Council Resolution 2250 on Youth, Peace, and Security.\textsuperscript{94} Furthermore, the UN Secretary-General’s Plan of Action on Preventing Violent Extremism (2015) highlights the importance of quality education in reducing poverty and social marginalisation, as well as in fostering respect for human rights and diversity, developing critical thinking, promoting media and digital literacy and contributing to peaceful coexistence and tolerance.\textsuperscript{95} The relationship between education and violent extremism has also been underscored in the recently adopted Manila Declaration to Counter the Rise of Radicalisation and Violent Extremism as well as in the EU’s Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy.\textsuperscript{96}
18th Informal ASEM Seminar on Human Rights

The Informal ASEM Seminar on Human Rights series was launched in 1997 to deepen relations between civil society actors and governments in Asia and Europe on human rights issues. The Seminar series is co-organised by the Asia-Europe Foundation (ASEF), the Raoul Wallenberg Institute (nominated by the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs), the French Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs, the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs, and the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs. The 18th Informal ASEM Seminar on Human Rights is hosted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia.

Participation in the 18th Informal ASEM Seminar on Human Rights will take place in 4 simultaneous working group discussions (on Day 2) on the 4 following topics:

1. Push & Pull Factors of Violent Extremism
2. Targeting Violent Extremism at the Local Level
3. Violent Extremism: Women’s Involvement, Rights & Security
4. Youth, Education & Prevention of Violent Extremism

In addition to the guiding questions specific to each working group, there are cross-cutting questions which are valid across all the 4 working groups. The cross-cutting questions and the working group questions are the following:

Cross-cutting Questions

1. Which attributes would have to be captured in the definition of ‘prevention of violent extremism’ in order for it to reflect both Asian and European agency, while demonstrating awareness of historical and cultural contexts?
2. To what extent does the lack of data and lack of consensus on conceptual definitions affect the efforts regarding preventing violent extremism? How can the situation be improved?
3. The Former UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, stated in 2016 that “short-sighted policies, failed leadership, heavy-handed approaches, a single-minded focus only on security measures and an utter disregard for human rights have often made things worse.” From your country’s perspective, do you agree with this?
4. The World Organization for Resource Development and Education has proposed a cluster model of five potential risk factors which could lead to radicalization: Sociological Motivators, Economic Factors, Political Grievances, Psychological Factors, as well as Ideology, Beliefs & Values. How can ASEM and its partners contribute to the mitigation of these risk factors and thus, the prevention of violent extremism?
5. Why does tolerance / social and cultural integration not suffice as a quick-fix in the prevention of violent extremism?
6. As “hate speech” increasingly fills online news forums and appears on social media feeds, freedom of expression has become one of the most controversially debated intersections between human rights concerns and the prevention of violent extremism. Should national governments have the last word on their citizens’ online interactions?
7. Media outreach is a powerful tool in awareness-raising and activism. How can online initiatives manifest themselves in ‘real-life’ prevention of violent extremism?
8. The priority of human rights stakeholders in pursuit of preventing violent extremism should be...
   a) Changes in policy or changes in law?
   b) Agency on a local or on a regional level?
   c) Implementations from the top down or bottom-up?
Push & Pull Factors of Violent Extremism

1. The United Nations Secretary-General described violent extremism as neither new nor exclusive to any region, nationality or system of belief, but rather as a phenomenon that can be triggered when human rights are violated. Which of these violations could constitute drivers of violent extremism? (United Nations, 2015)

2. Many ASEM countries have committed to adopting measures aimed at addressing the conditions conducive to violent extremism, including the lack of the rule of law and violations of human rights. More concretely, how can the promotion and protection of human rights contribute to the prevention of violent extremism?

3. It has been suggested that the measures addressing prevention of violent extremism have focused mainly on religious ideology as the driver of extremism, while other forms of extremist behaviour have been overlooked. What are the implications of this?

4. According to Dr Magnus Ranstorp, violent extremism can be best conceptualized as a kaleidoscope of factors creating infinite individual combinations. In light of this, can profiling be justified as a tool in the identification of persons who are vulnerable to the outreach of violent extremist organisations?

5. How can education address some of the push and pull factors that are linked to violent extremism?

6. Which factors make young adults increasingly vulnerable to the outreach of violent extremists?

Targeting Violent Extremism at the Local Level

1. The right to directly and indirectly participate in political and public life is important in empowering individuals and groups and is one of the core elements of human rights-based approaches aimed at eliminating marginalisation and discrimination (OHCHR). How can community participation in the decision-making processes with respect to preventing violent extremism be enhanced and made more inclusive? Can you think of any good examples related to inclusive participation?

2. An article by the Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict on guest workers’ draw towards different violent extremist groups states that “while the workers were systematically underpaid and exploited, this abuse was not a direct factor in radicalisation [...] the search for a sense of community in an unfamiliar environment may have been more important”. How could this have been avoided? (IPAC, 2017)

3. How can local companies in the private sector contribute, - in a manner that does not negatively impact on any human rights - to the prevention of violent extremism?

4. What mechanisms need to be put into place so a regional agency regarding prevention of violent extremism can be manifested in communities?

5. Can community-led initiatives on the prevention of violent extremism be scaled up to a national or regional level since the drivers of violent extremism vary across contexts?

6. Thus far, only little attention has been paid to the economic and socio-political environment in which individuals become drawn to extreme measures to express hatred or dissatisfaction. What role can local community leaders play in negating such clashes?

7. While prevention of violent extremism programs may bring needed resources to communities (e.g. in the form of humanitarian aid or development assistance) they may also run the risk of isolating communities whose support is critical to the effectiveness of the programs. How can this be avoided?

8. From shaping attitudes toward non-violence to serving as a “front line” actor in identifying early signs of violent extremism and intervening in the process, families can represent invaluable allies in prevention of violent extremism efforts. How can (and should) families’ involvement in prevention of violent extremism be encouraged and enhanced?
Violent Extremism: Women’s Involvement, Rights & Security

1. What makes the involvement of women indispensable to the prevention of violent extremism?
2. While women play an important part in the prevention of violent extremism, they are often denied the chance to play this role in many environments at the community level. How can women’s involvement in prevention efforts be encouraged and enhanced?
3. Peace is inextricably linked to equality between men and women, and violence, including extremist violence, is underpinned by gender inequality (UN Security Council resolution 1325). How can a gendered approach improve responses to violent extremism?
4. Why have women and girls mainly been alluded to as victims or bystanders of violent extremism, as opposed to potential actors in the prevention thereof?
5. How could communities protect girls and women from being used as catalysts of violent extremist agendas? Consider the roles of mothers, in particular.
6. In many cases, women and girls are stripped from their basic human rights due to geopolitical proximities to violent extremism. Can a discourse exist between the suppressed and their role in the prevention future oppression?

Youth, Education & Prevention of Violent Extremism

1. Should a part of school teachers’ responsibility lie in monitoring their students’ attitudes and “flagging” irregular behaviour? What are possible implications of this?
2. To what extent can media and information literacy counter precursors of violent extremism?
3. Albert Bandura’s social cognitive theory of moral disengagement suggests that violent extremism appears where a person disengages from their moral standards. Usually, moral conduct is attained over socialization processes; it has been argued that reinforcements of a person’s moral awareness may prevent them from being influenced by violent extremism. How could this theory be applied in practice?
4. ‘Peace education’ is a term which has often been used to refer to an early fostering of peaceful coexistence and tolerance amongst youth. Which educational components are essential tools in this endeavour?
5. According to basic human rights, children and teenagers should be spending most of their time in a classroom environment. Inevitably, students may find themselves in situations at school or at home which demand judgement beyond their scope of experience. Which pathways could the education sector provide for these students to raise their concerns or observations safely and in confidence?
6. How can youth groups / peer-lead programmes become involved in the prevention of violent extremism?
ENDNOTES:

2 A/70/674, para 3.
3 Ibid.
4 Omer Taspinar “Fighting Radicalism, not ‘Terrorism’: Root Causes of an International Actor Redefined, SAIS Review 29, no. 2:76
7 “Violence” as defined by the World Health Organization (WHO): “the intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another person, or against a group or community, that either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, maldevelopment, or deprivation.”
8 See Faliza Patel, ‘Rethinking Radicalization’, Brennan Center for Justice (2011)
10 According to e.g. H. Mirahmadi (2016), violent extremist worldviews are often framed within binary “us versus them”, “good versus evil”, or “right versus wrong” rhetoric, all of which represent value monism, p.135.
13 Many states have sought to adopt new legislation to criminalise “extremist” speech, by creating offences such as encouragement, glorification of terrorism or lending material support to terrorism. See A/HRC/31/65, para 39.
15 A/HRC/31/65, para 54.
16 “Initiatives to “counter and prevent violent extremism” raise serious human rights concerns”, Joint written statement submitted by Article 19, Amnesty International and fifty-six other NGOs’s (4 February 2016)
18 Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Laos, Myanmar, Cambodia, Vietnam & Brunei
23 https://www.nusemb.org.uk/napx/8271
24 China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, India and Pakistan.
29 For example, the European Commission’s Communication on “Preventing Radicalisation to Terrorism and Violent Extremism: Strengthening the EU’s response of January 2014” the European Agenda on Security of April 2015, as well as the Council conclusions on the Renewed Internal Security Strategy of June 2015, which address issued of disengagement, rehabilitation and de/anti-radicalisation as priority issues for action.
31 Ibid.
33 Ibid. poverty, unemployment, illiteracy, discrimination, and political / economic marginalization.
34 Hassan, Muhsin (2012).
36 See e.g. UNDP, ‘Journey to Extremism in Africa: Drivers, Incentives and the Tipping Point for Recruitment’ (2017); International Alert, ‘Why Young Syrians Choose to Fight. Vulnerability and resilience to recruitment by violent extremist groups in Syria’ (2016).
37 See Europol’s annual EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2017.
38 See e.g. Alava et al., ‘Youth and Violent Extremism on Social Media’ (2017) UNESCO. See also Schils & Verhage, ‘Understanding How and Why Young People Enter Radical’, International Journal of Conflict and Violence (Vo1.11#02/2017) or Violent Extremist Groups
39 A/HRC/31/65, para 36.
40 See e.g. ‘the Aarhus model’ in Denmark, or ‘the Mechelen model’ in Belgium.

43 According to a study conducted by Durham University in 2011, both Muslim and no-Muslim members of the community in the UK felt that counter-terrorism law and policy generally was contributing towards hostility to Muslims by treating Muslims as a 'suspect group', and creating a climate of fear and suspicion towards them. See Tufyal Choudhury and Helen Fenwick, 'The impact of counter-terrorism measures on Muslim communities' (2011).

44 See ‘Joint written statement submitted by Article 19, Amnesty International and fifty-six other NGO’s. Initiatives to “counter and prevent violent extremism” raise serious human rights concerns’ (4 February 2016).

45 http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx As of 2017, the Covenant had been signed by 170 countries, including 46 ASEM countries.

46 According to the UN Special Rapporteur on the right to privacy, there is no one piece of national surveillance legislation which perfectly complies with and respects the right to privacy (March 2018).

47 The UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression has noted that the prevention of violent extremism measures adopted by countries are rarely drawn narrowly enough to satisfy the necessity or proportionality criteria (A/71/373, para 23).

48 According to the report of the UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief, nearly 60 per cent of countries experienced increases in government restrictions and social hostilities involving religion or belief in 2015 (A/72/365, para 16.)

49 Covered in articles 14 and 15 in ICCPR.

50 Recognised as a legal right in a number of international conventions, including the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC).


52 A/HRC/31/65, para 41


54 The survey included respondents from 8000 participants in eight countries: China, Egypt, France, India, Indonesia, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

55 https://www.csis.org/analysis/survey-findings-global-perceptions-violent-extremism


57 Khalid Koser, “5 ways communities can counter violent extremism” (2015). Available at: https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2015/05/5-ways-communities-can-counter-violent-extremism/

58 See e.g. Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy (June 2016); or Communications from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions Supporting the Prevention of Radicalisation Leading to Violent Extremism (June 2016).


60 Manila Declaration to Counter the Rise of Radicalisation and Violent Extremism, adopted in September 2017

61 “From Theory To Action: Gender At the Eu’s Policy Framework” (Available at: http://www.bic-rhr.com/from-theory-to-action-gender-at-the-eus-policy-framework/)


63 “Preventing Terrorism and Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to Terrorism: A Community-Policing Approach”, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) (February 2014). Available at: https://www.osce.org/atu/111438?download=true


65 See e.g. Mothers for Change project by Women Without Borders.

66 A/HRC/31/65, para 53.

67 https://www.osce.org/secretariat/99919?download=true


69 According to a study conducted by Durham University in 2011, both Muslim and no-Muslim members of the community in the UK felt that counter-terrorism law and policy generally was contributing towards hostility to Muslims by treating Muslims as a ‘suspect group’, and creating a climate of fear and suspicion towards them. See Tufyal Choudhury and Helen Fenwick, ‘The impact of counter-terrorism measures on Muslim communities’ (2011).


71 Khalid Koser, “5 ways communities can counter violent extremism” (2015). Available at: https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2015/05/5-ways-communities-can-counter-violent-extremism/

72 See e.g. Mothers for Change project by Women Without Borders.


74 See e.g. Mothers for Change project by Women Without Borders.


76 Ibid.

77 Global International Forum (GCF) is an international forum of 29 countries and the European Union.


80 Ibid.

81 https://en.unesco.org/preventing-violent-extremism


86 Report by the UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Education, A/72/496, para 54.
91 According to Progress towards the Sustainable Development Goals report by the UN Secretary-General, despite considerable gains in education enrollment in the past decade, access to education, as well as educational inequality in terms of outcomes and unequal distribution of educational resources such as trained teachers, technologies, still constitute a major challenge in education (E/2017/66, para 8).
92 E/2017/66, paras 8 and 12.